High real interest rates have been observed in many countries for several months after the adoption of disinflation programs. While they may reflect primarily a liquidity crunch, high ez post real interest rates can also be explained in terms of an ez post error in inflation expectations that reflects a lack of credibility of the low-inflation policy. The latter hypothesis is tested using data for Argentina, Israel, and Mexico during the implementation of the stabilization programs in the mid-1980s.
HIGH REAL INTEREST RATES IN THE AFTERMATH OF DISINFLATION:

I. Introduction
High real interest
Is it a Lack of Credibility?
Graciela L. Kaminsky and Leonardo Leidermanl rates have been observed in many countries for several months after the adoption of disinflation programs. For example, six months after the start of stabilization plans in Argentina, Israel, and Mexico in the mid-eighties, real interest rates were still on the order of 40-50 percent per year (see Table 1 ). Much higher real interest rates have been observed in the aftermath of hyperinflations. For example, real interest rates reached about 100 percent per year six months after the Bolivian stabilization of October 1985 (see Calvo and Guldotti, 1992) . Dornbusch (1986) presented similar evidence for the first year after the end of the German hyperinflation. High real interest rates, of about 5-6 percent per year, were also observed in OECD countries following reductions in the inflation rates in the early 1980s. The same phenomenon has been observed in the aftermath of several recent stabilizations in Eastern Europe, for example in Poland (see Calve, 1992) . Although one possible explanation for this fact is that high real interest rates reflect primarily a shortage of liquidity induced by contractionary monetary policy (see, for example, Dornbusch, 1986) , recent research has stressed another explanation, which is the focus of this paper. Specifically, high ez post real rates can be explained in terms of an ez post error in inflation expectations, which reflects a lack of credibility of the low-inflation policy.
That is, despite some reductions in inflation immediately after the start of a stabilization program, nominal interest rates could remain high due to a lack of confidence in the program and hence the expectation that high inflation may return. Over time, and to the extent 1 Th e ~uthor~ are ~tafl economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SYSteXII and Professor at Tel-Aviv University, respectively. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the Federal Reserve System or other members of its staff. We have benefited from insightful discussions with G. A. Calvo on this topic. Seminar participants at Banco de M6xico and Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M+xico provided very helpful comments. Special thanks also go to two anonymous referees, whose careful review of an earlier draft led to substantial improvement. Work on this paper was partly done while Ka.minsky was visiting the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University and the International Monetary find; and Leiderman was visiting the International Monetary Fund. Both authors thank these institutions for their hospitality.
2 Notably, real intere8t rate8 fell in some orthodox exchange-rate-based stabilizations. For examPlel ' eal interest rates were negative (about -10 percent per year) in the first six months of the so-called Tablita programs in Argentina and Uruguay in the late 1970s. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this evidence to us.
-2-that the program results in disinflation, the new policy gains credibility, expectations of inflation are revised downward, and nominal (and real) interest rates exhibit a gradual decline. Throughout this process, expected inflation is likely to exceed actual inflation, and therefore ez ante real interest rates are smaller than rates observed ez post. 3 This paper explores the empirical relevance of arguments based on lack of credibility for explaining high ez post real interest rates after stabilization programs were implemented in Argentina, Israel, and Mexico in the mid-1980s. These countries experienced, to different degrees, chronic inflation in the post-WWII period, and investors were witnesses to many failed stabilization attempts. Naturally, after the collapse of several anti-inflationary programs, probably investors were reluctant to believe any new announcements made by the government right away. Instead, it is likely that market participants checked month after month to see whether, for example, monetary and fiscal policies were consistent with the announced inflation target. Unexpected expansionary monetary or fiscal shocks could lead investors to doubt the commitment of the authorities to low inflation. In this regard, the model below envisions economic agents as learning gradually, using Bayesian updating, about possible changes in the inflationary regime that they face.
Our main analysis considers two main inflationary regimes: one characterized by high inflation and the other by low inflation. Regimes can differ in the mean of inflation rates, in the degree of inflation persistence, and in the variance of shocks to the inflation process. We assume that in every period investors will try to assess the likelihood of being in a low or a high inflation regime by using information on inflation and on monetary and fiscal shocks.
In this way, we can use model estimates to construct time series for expected inflation, which we then use to calculate implied ez ante real interest rates. The analysis can then examine a key implication of credibility-based theories -namely, that high ez post real interest rates are not necessarily associated with high ez ante real rates. our results suggest that for Argentina the bulk of variation in nominal interest rates reflected movements in expected inflation. In contrast, after the stabilization program in Israel, nominal and ez ante real interest rates moved together. Last, the results for Mexico tell an intermediate story in which lack of credibility can explain only part of the high ez ~osi real interest rates.
3 Th e role of th e lack of credibility in accounting for the facts after disinflation Programs h= been recentlY emphasized by Calvo and Vdgh (1993) and Cukierman and Liviatan (1992) . Also, Lucas (1990) suggested attributing a large portion of the rise in ez post real interest rates in OECD countries in the early eighties to (ez post) wrong expectations. In particular, his view is that throughout most of the 1980s people expected high inflation to resume (to the levels of the 1970s), but these expectations turned out to be wrong. This view is supported by the empirical findings of Evans and Lewis (1992) .
-3-The paper is organized as follows. Section H provides a chronology of the events leading to the stabilization programs and discusses the salient features of the plans. Section III provides a theoretical background and Section IV describes our methodology of estimation. Section V presents the main results and Section VI concludes.
II. Antecedents and Salient Features of the Three Stabilization Plans*
Argentina, Israel. and Mexico have all experienced chronic inflation in the postwar period and -to different degrees-also have a rich history of failed stabilization programs. 5 A study of investors' credibility (or lack of) in the stabilization plans of the 1980s requires some historical background to identify the main reasons why, typically, the private sector might view with skepticism any new attempt to bring inflation down to international levels.
Argentina's average inflation was already above 30 percent in the 1960s, and despite several major attempts, such as the 1978 Tablita program, the government was unsuccessful until very recently in reducing inflation to levels observed in industrialized countries.
Naturally, the immediate cause of inflation was high money growth, with money printing financing chron]c budget deficits. Inflation particularly accelerated in the mid-1970s with the Peronist government, when government deficits increased from about 5 percent of GDP in 1960 of GDP in -1975 to about 12 percent of GDP in the late 1970s (see Cavallo and Pena, 1983 Pazos ( 1972) and V4gh (1992) exhibits two key characteristics. 'irst! it may last for long periods of time; it is measured in terms, not of months, but of years. Second, chronic inflation has an intermediate intensity, higher than that of moderate inflation but much lower than that of hyperinflation, which results from countries learning how to live with high and persistent inflation by creating various indexation mechanisms. Specifically, inflation does not have an inherent propensity to accelerate, or if it does, it soon reaches a new plateau.
-. , ..,-,
-4-reached 6,000 percent per year and Argentina was only one step away from economic cataclysm. Against this background, in June 1985 the Alfonsin government announced the Aust~aZ plan, the first stabilization program to combine income policy with an initial dose of fiscal austerity. The four key features of the plan were the following: First, the government increased public sector prices, depreciated the exchange rate, and imposed import duties, export tariffs, and a forced saving scheme. It raised some tax rates and sped up tax collection. Second, the plan imposed a wage-price freeze and adopted a fixed exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. Third, a scale of conversion to adjust outstanding contracts for the immediate and unanticipated end of inflation was put into place. Fourth, a new monetary unit, the Austral, was introduced. Although the AustraZ plan helped to avoid economic collapse, inflation did not disappear mainly because of the lack of fiscal and monetary policy discipline. On the contrary, by mid-1986, inflation had risen above 100 percent at an annual rate and high government budget deficits had returned.
In contrast to Argentina, Israel and Mexico were low-inflation countries during the 1960s.
In the 1970s inflation skyrocketed and soon reached three-digit figures. The rate of inflation in Israel increased after 1977 primarily as a result of massive budget deficits and accommodating monetary policy. In the early 1980s, fiscal deficits averaged about 10 percent of GNP. The key factors in the government fiscal crisis were the government bail-out of banks in October 1983 after the collapse of bank share prices; the steep decline in tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, due in part to tax arrears, caused by the acceleration of inflation; and the government interest rate subsidies on fixed-rate loans to the private sector (see Dornbusch and Fischer, 1986) . By June 1985, inflation had reached 430 percent at an annual rate. In
July 1985, the government announced a new stabilization package. The plan had three main features (see Leiderman, 1993) : First, the new shekel replaced the old shekel at the rate of 1:1,000, and its parity with respect to the U.S. dollar was fixed at 1.5 new shekels per dollar.
Second, a Draconian fiscal plan was implemented, balancing the government budget almost overnight. Public expenditure was reduced by 10 percent. These savings were accomplished mainly through major reductions in defense expenditures and cuts in subsidies of various kinds, including subsidies on foodstuffs and government-provided goods and services. Third, the government and trade unions agreed to a social pact to break the inflationary inertia due to price and wage indexation. This pact included a 14 percent increase in general wages, followed by a freeze in nominal wages and the suspension of indexation for 3 months. With fiscal and monetary policy under control, the annual inflation rate was reduced below 20 percent ever since the adoption of the plan.
-5-During the 1960s, Mexico experienced the same inflation rate as the United States. In the early 1970s, the fiscal deficit started to rise quite rapidly. Large increases in government spending drove the consolidated public sector deficit upward from 2.5 percent of GDP in 1971 to 10 percent in 1975. The growth in the deficit was mainly fueled by increased losses by the non-PEMEX state-owned enterprises. Fiscal deficits were financed in large measure by borrowing from the Central Bank, which in turn accelerated inflation. On August 31, 1976, the peso was devalued nearly 100 percent, and the annual rate of inflation that year reached 27 percent. Shortly after the devaluation, a letter of intent was submitted to the IMF outlining a stabilization program to be implemented in stages over the following three years. The stabilization program was fairly successful in its first year, with the government deficit decreasing from 9.9 percent to 6.7 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, inflation remained at a 2-digit levels. In 1982 inflation escalated, fueled by enormous increases in the government deficit due to large subsidies to aid firms holding dollar debt, to an emergency scheme involving fiscal relief and outright subsidies to support "productive firms," and to tax exemptions equaling 15 percent of the monthly payroll to firms that could prove they had maintained employment levels. Although fiscal austerity plans were announced, fiscal discipline was not persistently enforced, and by 1986 the overall budget deficit had reached 15 percent of GDP.
To stop inflation the government announced a stabilization plan in December 1987, which included a one-year fixed exchange rate as well as a "pacto social" to reduce inflation. As in Israel, a profound fiscal reform was implemented. The tax code was reformed, major cuts were made in government spending, and many of state-owned enterprises were privatized.
Although in 1987 there was already a large primary surplus, the overall deficit continued to be high for a couple of years because of the service of the public debt. were successful in persistently reducing inflation to levels below 20 percent per year,6 the policies in Argentina failed and inflation resumed almost immediately to levels similar to those prevailing before the plan. The behavior of money, credit to the private sector, budget deficits, and the rate of inflation suggests two patterns in the data: Israel and Mexico show a steady contraction in real monetary aggregates and budget deficits after the plans were implemented. In contrast, Argentina does not show such. monetary contraction or long--lasting fiscal austerity. Despite these differences, all three countries show high ez post real 6 The Mexican stabilization program finally collapsed in December 1994 with a devaluation of the peso on the order of 100 percent.
-6-interest rates in the first few quarters after stabilization.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies and the Feasibility of the Stabilization Plan
In this section we elaborate on how agents possibly decide whetherto believe that the announced stabilization plan will actually be carried out. It is plausible to postulate that when an anti-inflationary program is implemented, investors will try to assess the viability of the plan by examining whether government policies are in fact consistent with the new announced low-inflation target. As the basic ingredient in the three stabilization plans was the fixing of the exchange rate to anchor inflation to "world" levels, we now discuss how investors assess the feasibility of the fixed-exchange-rate regime.
The plan of bringing down inflation to world levels by fixing the exchange rate is based on the idea that, at least over the long run, domestic inflation will converge to foreign inflation plus the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency:
(1) Apt = Ap~ + Aei where Ap t is the domestic inflation rate, Ap~ is the foreign inflation rate, and Aet is the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency. If the exchange rate is fixed, Aet is zero, and the domestic inflatlon rate will converge over time to the foreign inflation rate.
The decision to fix the exchange rate, so as to anchor domestic inflation to world inflation, naturally constrains monetary and fiscal policies because the rate of growth of the money supply becomes demand-determined. For example, if domestic credit expansion financing a government deficit is higher than the world inflation rate, there will be an excess supply of money leading to continuous outflows of foreign exchange reserves. When foreign exchange reserves of the central bank are depleted, the authorities will be forced to abandon the fixed-exchange-rate regime. A viable fixed-exchange-rate regime requires the growth rate of domestic credit to be smaller than or equal to the world inflation rate. Thus, an increasing rate of expansion of domestic credit, perhaps financing a government deficit, will signal conflicts between monetary and fiscal policies and inflation targets, leading investors to expect an abandonment of the stabilization package.
Suppose that the demand for money is given by a stable Cagan money demand function (2) m: -pt = m) -m' alit + /.q where m: and pt are the natural logarithms of money demand and the price level, respectively, it is the domestic interest rate, aO is a scale variable, al is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the rate of interest, and # d is a money-demand shock.
-.. .
With international capital mobility, the domestic nominal interest rate is linked to the world interest rate (3) it = i" + A~e~+l + p where i* is the world nominal interest rate and p is the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates reflecting imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds. In this example, we assume for simplicity that both i* and p are constant. Finally, Atet+l is the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
In the long run, the growth rate of money demand in a fixed-exchange-rate regime will be (4) m'
Am: = Ap~ + Apt
The demand for money in (4) will restrict the growth rate of the money supply in the fixedexchange-rate regime and impose a binding restriction on the part of the government budget deficit financed by money creation.
Since in chronic-inflation countries, the growth rate of the (domestically created) money supply has been determined primarily by the government's need to raise revenue through seigniorage to finance the budget deficit, we assume that the growth rate of the domestic component of the money supply follows the following process:
(5)
where Adct is the rate of growth of the domestically created money supply at time t, dt is the government's budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, -yO is a constant term, 71 measures the response of money growth to a 1 percent change in the government deficit (as a percentage of GDP), and p~' is a money supply shock.
The budget deficit in every period is assumed to follow an autoregressive process
where bot is a variable whose value depends on the government fiscal stance, with large bot before the stabilization program and smaller ones afterward if the government is genuinely committed to the austerity pian, and P: is a fiscal shock.
In the long run, for the stabilization plan to be feasible, monetary and fiscal policies have to guarantee that foreign exchange reserves of the central bank are not depleted. Naturally,
-8-domestic inflation should also be equal to foreign inflation. With foreign exchange reserves constant and without loss of generality assumed to be zero, the growth rate of money supply will be fixed-exchange-rate regime, and will be higher, by assumption, than the world inflation rate. Equation (9a) represents the stochastic process followed by inflation in the low-inflation regime and equation (9b) represents the stochastic process followed by inflation in the high-inflation regime.7
If we denote the low-inflation regime by Rt = O and the high-inflation regime by Rt = 1, the probability of success of the announced stabilization program will be
In (10) large money supply shocks or large positive fiscal shocks will make investors doubtful about the ability of the government to tame inflation. 8 In the next section, we will use T Equation (gb) w= derived under the assumption that p; and bot follow a random ' alk Process"
a Natura]ly, during th e transition period, when the rate of inflation starts to ~ecrease, domestic credit can expand at a rate exceeding AP" without jeopardizing the long-run success of the reform because the demand for money will incresse because of disinflation. Thus, in the short run, the Central Bank will not . ---9-this measure of feasibility" of the announced stabilization programs to estimate the expected inflation rate and the expected real interest rate.
IV. Methodology
With a changing fiscal and monetary stance, the stochastic process followed by inflation will also change over time-To examine whether high ez post real interest rates reflect just a lack of credibility, we focus our attention on the changing stochastic process followed by inflation before and after the stabilization program is implemented. We first examine whether in fact the stochastic process folIowed by inflation changed after the stabilization program was implemented and then examine whether the low-inflation reform was credible by looking at the probabilities of being in a low-inflation regime implied by the model. These probabilities will allow us to examine whether high ez post real interest rates reflect a lack of credibility or a credit crunch. Moreover, the difference between the actual and the estimated inflation rates will allow us to calculate what part of the increase in ez post real interest rates is explained by the credibility effect.
More specifically, we model the inflation rate as following a two-state switching regime process. As in SectIon HI the probability of being in a Iow-inflation regime was related to fiscal and monetary shocks, we assume in the estimation process that market participants assess the current inflationary regime using past and current information on inflation, money, and the government budget deficit. The model consists of the following equations: -10-
In (11) inflation, Apt, 1s modeled as an autoregressive process of order q with state-dependent constant, autoregressive parameters, and volatility, Since the high inflation regime is denoted by Rt = 1, one expects that 6: < 6;. Since most of the stabilization packages included deindexation schemes, one expects that inflation persistence will decrease after the stabilizatioñ =1 6;. Equation (12) shows the Markov chain program is implemented, that is ~~=1 J; <29
. . transition probability matrix, I_I t , where J~J is the period t probability of switching from Regime z to Regime j in one period.
As examined in Sections II and III, stabilization attempts in chronic-inflation countries are likely to suffer from lack of credibility. Chronic-inflation countries have learned to live with high inflation, and as a result, the incentives to eradicate inflation are less than those in hyperinflation. Furthermore, countries with chronic inflation have a rich history of many failed stabilization attempts. As a result, typically policymakers will have a hard time convincing skeptical investors that the current stabilization plan will not collapse. Doubts about how likely these plans are to succeed can also be fueled by positive shocks to money growth and the budget deficit. To account for this behavior, we have introduced in (12) time-varying transition probabilities. These transition probabilities in turn depend on the behavior of those market fundamentals that indicate consistency of the announced monetary and fiscal policies with inflation targets. In line with the analysis in Section III, equations (13a) and (13b) postulate that the probability of switching regimes will be fiected by surprises in the '. Positive money and money market, e?, and by surprises in the government budget deficit et fiscal shocks will suggest that the stabilization program is in danger of collapsing, with the probabilities of being in a high-inflation regime increasing (that is, ~~ and ~d are expected -11-to be positive).
9 If d~ and /3~ are equal to zero, the model collapses to that of Hamilton (1988) with constant transition probabilities A"l and J1°.10
Equations (14a) and (146) describe the estimation of money and fiscal shocks. The money shock, +', is a composite of money SUpply and money demand shocks and is estimated as the difference between the SUpply of real money balances minus the demand for money, which is inversely related to nominal interest rates, as assumed in equation (2). According to equations ( 13u) and (14a), unexpected increases in money supply or unexpected decreases in the demand for money will increase the probabilities of switching to a high inflation regime.
Forecasts of government deficits are constructed using lagged government deficits and current and lagged nominal interest rates, as described in equation (146). Naturally, if fiscal reforms are implemented, the process followed by the fiscal deficit will be changing over time, as described in equation (6). TO capture the evolving fiscal policy, we introduce the nominal interest rate in the forecasting equation. Because nominal interest rates fluctuate with inflation, they provide information about the changing degree of austerity of the government and the monetization of the fiscal imbalances. 11
To alIow for lack of credibility, we assume that market participants do not observe the current regime directly nor do they know when the regime switch will take place. Investors must estimate the probabilities of being in the different regimes based on the available information. Forecasts will look biased ez post if regime changes occur only sporadically.
For example, if Regime O persists for some time, the sample mean of the forecast errors conditioned on l?~ = O will be negative even though forecasts are rational ez ante. As argued above, the claim that ez ante real interest rates are significantly different from ez post real interest rates 1s equivalent to the hypothesis of a peso problem after the stabilization program is implemented.
To estimate the model in equations (11) - (14), we use a modified Hamilton's (1988) nonlinear filter. Since there is no presumption that in fact there were changes in regime, the estimation procedure does not impose the existence of two differentiated states. Moreover, the estimation is based on the assumption that the regime is not observed directly but must be inferred based on the observation of current and past values of inflation, money, interest 9 To obtain a more parsirnmious model, we impose that monetary and fiscal shocks afTect the transition probabilities in the same proportion but with opposite signs.
In this case ,1 'J = exp(~O)/(1 + exp(PO))
11 Another possibility is to estimate equation (6); however, doing so would complicate the estimation process considerably.
-. . , .
-12-rates, and the fiscal deficit. The optimal forecast of this process can be thought of as the following sequence of steps: For any period t, we have a certain prior about the probability of being in state 1 or O based on past information. where Prior(Et = 1) = Prob(Rt = lllt-l), It = {Apt, mt, d t , it, ..., Apl, ml, dl, ii}, and Post(R~ = 1) = Prob(llt = 1 /1~). We then calculate the density function of Apt (16) Finally, we update our predictions using the Bayes formula:
(17) Post(R, = 1) =~( AptlRt = l) Prior(Rt = 1) (Apt \lt_l)
We update repeatedly over the entire sample using (15) - (17).
The estimation procedure is as follows. We start at t = 1 with the unconditional probability, which we set equal to the limiting probability of being in Regime 1 of the Markov process in equation (15). Using (15)- (17) we construct the sample log likelihood which can be maximized numerically with respect to the unknown parameters 68 ~ J;, a? ~ @o, @m,~, and the parameters in the forecasting equations (equations (14a) and (14b)).
V. Results
The model in equations (11 )- (14) ..,---13- Table 2 reports the results of this estimation. Panel A presents the estimates of the coei?icients in equations (11 )- ( 13). Panel B presents the average monetary and fiscal shocks over different periods, as estimated from equations ( 14a) and (146).13 We find that the inflation process in each regime is best described by an autoregressive process of order one.
Hence we report just the results imposing q = 1. The estimated stochastic process foUowed by inflation has three main features. First, the estimates capture a low-inflation and a highinffation regime for aIl the countries. In all three cases, the estimated J. is lower in Regime O (low inflation) than in Regime 1 (high inflation). For example, in Israel we find that 60 is equal to 1.3 percent per month in the low-inflation regime while it increases to 3.7 percent per month during the high-inflation regime. Second, the degree of inflation persistence is estimated to be higher under high inflation than under low inflation. This may well be the result of the tight targeting of wages, prices, and the exchange rate under the broad agreements (social pacts) underlying heterodox programs. Third, in all cases the volatility of the shocks to the inflation process also seem to be contingent on the regime: high volatility prevails under high inflation.
The estimated probabilities of switching regimes are composed of two terms, the constant part, ~ = exp(~o)/( 1 + exp(~o)), and a time-varyin g part, which depends on the coefficients n and ~~, which in turn measure the response of the probabilities to money and fiscal shocks, respectively. Interestingly, we find that money and fiscal shocks do provide additional information on the stochastic process followed by the rate of inflation. In all cases we can reject at all conventional significance levels the null hypothesis that the probabilities of switching regimes are constant as in the Hamilton (1988) model. As expected, positive money and fiscal shocks increase the probabilities of switching to a high-inflation regime.
Note that in the case of Argentina and Mexico the probabilities of switching regimes depend only on the monetary indicator. For Israel, the fiscal indicator is the one that affects the probabilities of switching regimes.
As noted above, panel B provides some indication of the severity of the fiscal or monetary contractions in each country over time. We measure the depth of the anti-inflation program by the average of the shocks to monetary or fiscal policies, as estimated from equations (14a) and (146). Since the probabilities of switching regimes in Argentina and Mexico depend only on monetary shocks, the index of severity for these two countries reflects only the depth of 13 wre d. not report th e estimates of the parameters in equations (14a) and (14b) because they '" ' ot provide any additional information to the discussion of credibility of the stabilization plans. However, they are available from the authors upon request.
.--14-the monetary contraction. Since only fiscal shocks seem to matter in the determination of the probabilities of switching regimes in Israel, the index of severity for Israel provides only a measure of fiscal austerity. The index is set equal to 100 for the twelve months before the stabilization program is launched. A number larger than 100 indicates a more severe contraction relative to the twelve months before stabilization. Using the results in this panel, the countries can be ranked according to the depth of the reform as follows: Israel first; Mexico second; and Argentina last. For the failed AustraZ plan in Argentina, the index reflects only a transitory monetary contraction during the first six months of the program.
In contrast, the following eighteen months were characterized by an expansionary monetary policy that contributed to the collapse of the stabilization attempt. In contrast, the indexes for Israel and (to a lesser extent) for Mexico reflect a more persistent and drastic reform.
From the estimation of the model in equations (11)- (14) we can obtain the implied prior probabilities of a low-inflation regime. These probabilities measure the short-run (onemonth) credibility of the stabilization package. The probabilities are reported in Figure 1 together with the level of foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. NaturaIly, in all the countries, before the stabilization program was implemented inflation was rampant as a result of expansionary monetary policy and large government deficits. The estimated probabilities capture this situation. In general, the probabilities of being in a low-inflation regime range from 1 percent to 30 percent in the 24 months before the implementation of the stabilization packages. After the implementation of the stabilization packages, the probabilities of a lowinflation regime increase sharply. Israel shows the strongest increase in these probabilities, whose levels reach about 99 percent within nine months after the program is implemented.
A sharp fiscal restrain, as measured by the index of severity of the reform in Table 2, at rates similar to those in the pre-stabilization period, the large monetization of the economy, due to the stabilization, results in a liquidity crunch: In this period, money shocks (money supply minus money demand shocks) are three times more restrictive than in the twelve months before stabilization (see Table 2 In Figure 2 we compare expected and actual rates of inflation before and after the implementation of the various stabilization programs. The two series move together, with expected inflation being lower than actual inflation before the stabilization program is implemented (and inflation is increasing) and higher after the stabilization program was implemented (and inflation is falling). The figures suggest that for Argentina there were prolonged episodes of ez post expectations errors in which expected inflation generally exceeded actual inflation. On average, during the eighteen months following the implementation of the program the forecasting error was about 12 percent (annual rate). At variance with the above, the evidence for Israel indicates that, as a result of the sharp reduction in the probabilities of being in the high-inflation regime, which resulted in several observations for which expected inflation is lower (and not higher) than actual inflation, ez ~ost and ez ante inflation rates are practically the same in the aftermath of the stabilization program. Consequently: ez ante and ez post inflation rates diverge substantially in Argentina, but they move together in Israel (see our credibility tests below). The results for Mexico tell an intermediate story in which credibility starts to decline somewhat six months after the implementation of the program, but is restored a bit over the medium run. In any case, the average forecasting errors during the first year of the program are on the order of 6 percent at an annual rate.
We calculate (actual and expected) real interest rates in period t for each country by subtracting the (actual and expected) inflation rate between periods t and t + 1. Figure   3 depicts actual and expected real interest rates. One sees that lack of credibility and the gradual learning of the new regime go a long way in accounting for observed high ez post real interest rates in Argentina. For example : ez ante real rates after the Austrai program are just 24 percent per year whereas the ez post real interest rates average approximately 58 percent per annum over the semester after the stabilization. Thus, the distinction between ez post and ez ante real rates has empirical content. In contrast, the movements in the ez ante real interest rates in Israel tell a different story, one of an apparent credit crunch that
14 Th e re9ults just described coincide with the chronology of the developments of the stabilization package in Canavese and Di Tella (1988) . These authors describe four stages of the Audral plan aa follows: 'The first lasted ten months, from June 1985 until March 1986, and was characterized by a price freeze and fiscal austerity. The second stage, from April to September 1986, was characterized by an attempt to administer prices in an e~y money environment, resulting in a re-indexing of the economy and an acceleration of inflation. In the third stage, from october 1986 to February 1987, a restrictive monetary policy to curb renewed inflationary process W= tried, despite the increased fiscal deficit. And finally, in the fourth stage, from February on, a new price and wage freeze and an announcement of a devaluation path until July 1987 were made." (page 157)
-17-lasted for more than 18 months on average. Finally, the resuits for Mexico suggest that lack of credibility can expiain only part of the high ez post real interest rates.
.41s0, we formally tested whether expected inflation differs significantly from actual inflation. For this purpose, we estimated the model inflation mean error (and corresponding t-statistic) for different subsamples: 18 months, 12 months, and 6 months before the stabilization program and 6 months, 12 months, and 18 months after the stabilization program.
The results of this test are reported in Table 3 . As expected, we capture a significant difference between actual and expected inflation for Argentina and Mexico after the stabilization program is implemented. on the contrary, for IsraeI we fail to find any bias in inflationary expectations.
VI. Conclusions
This paper examines whether investors' lack of credibility in the stabilization programs Although our findings account, at least for Argentina and to a lesser extent for Mexico, for a substantial fraction of the rise in ez post real interest rates after disinflation in terms of lack of full policy credibility, there is a residual that needs to be explained. As indicated in the introduction, in some cases contractionary monetary policy may have contributed to high real interest rates after stabilization. We leave it for future research to determine the extent to which this additional factor accounts for the residual evidence.
In the 1980s debtor countries such as Argentina, Israel, and Mexico did not have complete access to international capital markets. After the debt crisis, according to international market perceptions, country risk for these countries certainly increased. For example, as noted by Khor and Rojas-Suarez (1991) (1990) ). Notwithstanding the different international scenario, the behavior of ez post real interest rates in purely exchange-rate-based plans -such as the Z'ablitu plans, which do not 15 The ~i~k ~remium is estimated as the difference between the return on Mexican dollar-denominated assets (PAGAFES) and the LIBOR rate.
.----19-rely on wage and price controls-may be different from their behavior in more comprehensive heterodox plans. Inflation inertia and backward-indexation may keep, in the context of the former plans, actual and expected inflation rate above the nominal interest rate that falls -at least transitorily-with the rate of devaluation. Although important, these extensions are beyond the scope of this paper. Dombuseh and de Pablo ( 1990) .
Notes: All rates of change tand in!~sr rates are expressed in percent per year. Ile red interest tm is computed using Ihe une-munth-i.hwd intimi~~n rate. KI) Annuid rate. (b) Annual (qu&erly) avemge of monthly rwcs. The government budget deficils Of these countries are defined us follows: for Mgentina the deficit series repnncd is the CuvaHo-Pena memum. for IRRWI me deficit corresponds m deticil o! Ihe central govemmerw and for Mcxict} it rctlccfs dw incr.dl public sector kticil. Notes: The mean forecast enorisexpressed inpercent per month.
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